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A Tactical Separation of Powers Doctrine
Aziz Z. Huq*
I.

The Problem of State Capture in South Africa

In Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa began its analysis of the free-speech rights of parliamentarians by declaring simply that
“South African is a constitutional democracy.”1 Justice Madlanga did not define that last key term.
Nevertheless, his opinion took it as an axiomatic basis of South African constitutional adjudication.
The following year, Chief Justice Mogoeng began his opinion in United Democratic Movement v Speaker
of the National Assembly and Others by using very similar language.2 This time, however, the Court added
some words of definition. Its definitional gloss echoed Abraham Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg
Address: A “constitutional democracy,” wrote Chief Justice Mogoeng, is a “government of the people,
by the people and the people through the instrumentality of the Constitution.”3 This is rather good as
rousing rhetoric. But it is less satisfying as a definition to guide legal interpretation. After all, it is not
at all clear how the definition picks out a discrete class of cases in which constitutional democracy is
imperiled. So long there is a government in power with some sort of claim to democratic legitimacy
derived in some fashion from the 1996 Constitution, it might be argued that some sort of
“constitutional democracy” still obtains. It is also not clear how this touchstone of “constitutional
democracy” could usefully illuminate constitutional adjudication. In cases concerning the allocation
of powers and privileges between different constitutional institutions, a domain sometimes known as
the ‘separation of powers,’ for example, the definition provides essentially no real help in
understanding ambiguous provisions. Yet Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Madlanga would not
have conjured a concern with constitutional democracy had not that value been imperiled in some
sense. They also would not have offered it as a lodestar in their opinions had they not believed that
the term in some meaningful way could and explain guide their legal analysis. As a result, these
opinions invite an inquiry into how a constitutional court can defend or protect constitutional
democracy—but do not, at least in their invocation of principles, provide much by way of an answer.
The nature of the then-relevant threat to the integrity of constitutional democracy in South
Africa is widely known. A perceptive commentator, writing roughly contemporaneously to the United
Democratic Movement judgment, summarized the South African political situation at the time in the
following terms:
[Jacob] Zuma’s presidency has been disastrous. Corruption has run riot, led by the
example of the President’s own family and their friends and benefactors, the Gupta
family, an immigrant Indian family whose tentacles are everywhere in government
departments and state-owned industries…. In effect, the state has been criminalized.
Officials who refuse to allocate contracts in the right direction will receive death
threats, and as there were more than two dozen political murders last year, no one

* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1 [2016] ZACC 8; 2016 (3) SA 487 (CC) (2016) at para 11.
2 United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT89/17) [2017] ZACC 21; 2017 (5) SA 300
(CC).
3 Ibid at para 1.
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believes that this is only bluffing. Confidence and trust in government have never been
lower, not even under apartheid.4
The origin of the crisis that has thrown “constitutional democracy” into such parlous
conditions, Samuel Issacharoff has argued in these pages, is political in origin. In recent years in South
Africa, Issacharoff contended, “the dominant party [the African National Congress, or ANC, became]
the center for all political and economic dealings with the government.”5 The effects of a dominant
party take several forms. The most important was a profusion of graft and systematic corruption.
During the tenure of Thabo Mbeki, an “ANC party state” developed in which party loyalists were
assigned to high posts in public office, parastatals came under party control rather than state control,
and ANC elites increasingly dominated the “commanding heights” of the private economy.6 In the
Zuma presidency that followed, the merger of the state with private interests accelerated. The state
was captured by a group of businesses owned and operated by three brothers sharing the Gupta name,
who manipulated state business to their personal advantage.7 This often involved the steering of public
contracts to preferred businesses owned by the Gupta at exorbitant rates in exchange for kickbacks
to ministers and other officials making allocative decisions.8 Ministers who declined to cooperate with
the Guptas were quickly relieved of their duties and office.9 As a result of ineffectual or corrupt
presidential leadership, a raft of structural, macroeconomic problems accumulated. State-owned
enterprises such as Eskom, Denel, and the South African Broadcasting Corporation, for example, fell
into dysfunction and courted bankruptcy.10 As R.W. Johnson has argued, the compromising of large
state enterprises has imperiled the state’s access to international credit markets. Eskom’s debt
contracts include cross-default clauses. Under these clauses, Eskom’s bankruptcy automatically results
in all loans to South African SOEs being called in. Looting one SOE is thus linked by law to the
prospect of a generalized financial crisis that the ANC is not well positioned to parry.11
Further, endemic corruption and graft preclude the delivery of some basic government
services. The macroeconomic strains generated by these inefficiencies are likely to generate even
sharper cuts in public services in the future. Relatedly, a generalized failure of law-and-order led to a
sharp spike in crime and vigilantism.12 This violence often had a political cast. Deadly violence against
critics of the ANC, as well as civil-society figures who had the temerity to complain of corruption,
spread rapidly. Surveying the resulting lawlessness and impunity, some commentators have proposed

RW Johnson ‘The Fall of Jacob Zuma and the Crisis of South Africa’ (2017) Quadrant 39.
S Issacharoff, The Democratic Risk to Democratic Transitions’ (2015) Constitutional Court Review 1, 3. The importance
of ANC dominance as a factor in the decline of democratic institutions is critically examined in T Roux ‘The South
African Constitutional Court’s Democratic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2015) Constitutional Court Review 33, 42-43.
6 R Southall ‘The coming crisis of Zuma’s ANC: the party state confronts fiscal crisis’ (2016) Review of African Political
Economy 73, 80.
7 “South Africa’s Public Protector Finds ‘State Capture’ by the President’s Pals,” Economist, 5 November 2016; L Chutel
& L Kuo ‘What the “State Capture” report tells us about Zuma, the Guptas, and corruption in South Africa’ QZ Africa,
3 November 2016.
8 S Bracking ‘Corruption & State Capture: What Can Citizens Do?’ (2018) Daedalus 169, 171..
9 ME Martin & H Solomon ‘Understanding the phenomenon of “state capture” in South Africa’ (2016) Southern African
Peace and Security Studies 21, 22-23.
10 On corruption and the SOEs, see the insightful analysis in RW Johnson, “Cyril Ramaphosa’s poisoned chalice” (2018)
Standpoint Magazine, April 2018.
11 Ibid.
12 On the failure of policing, see B Bradford, AZ Huq, JP Jackson, & B Roberts, ‘What Price Fairness when Security is at
Stake? Police Legitimacy in South Africa’ (2014) Regulation & Governance 246.
4
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a new concept of “violent democracy” to capture South Africa’s predicament.13 The ordinary
processes of political feedback, which might curb some of these trends, have too often been part
stymied as a result of party loyalty or corruption. The ANC rank-and-file, for example, has protected
corrupt leaders such as Zuma from censure or punishment, using complaints about “white monopoly
capitalism” to draw attention away from their malfeasance.14
The net result of these trends, according to a pivotal report by Thuli Madonsela, the former
Public Protector of South Africa,15 was a phase shift from diffuse, pervasive graft into a more
systematic phenomenon of “state capture,” in which the state effectively operated as a vehicle for a
narrow, unrepresentative set of private interests acting without democratic authorization.16 While the
evidence of state capture documented by Madonsela was particularly vivid, South Africa is hardly
alone facing this cluster of problems. Even before Zuma came to power, political scientists had
identified a relationship in African democracies between the concentration of political power
(particularly in the office of a president) and pathological forms of clientism.17
At first blush, the problem of state capture exemplified by the Zuma presidency might seem
intractable. It is not at all clear how the tools of constitutional law and institutional design might
remedy it for three reasons. First, the problem of state capture does not arise simply because one
office (the presidency) wielded too much control over fiscal and procurement decisions (although that
make it worse).18 Rather, as depicted by Madonsela’s “State of Capture” report, and as theorized in
Issacharoff’s work, state capture arises because of the electoral dominance of one party. In the case
of the ANC, that dominance reflects the pivotal role that the party played in the independence
movement, as well as the axial role of its former leader, Nelson Mandela, in the transition from
Apartheid. In the absence of the ANC, the 1996 South African Constitution would not exist in its
current form. But however powerful the party’s claim to democratic legitimacy in the aftermath of
independence, the very magnitude of its political dominance has opened a pathway toward state
capture.19
Second, one analysis of endemic corruption suggests that the latter arises in the context of a
transition to accelerated capitalist development, in which government officials inevitably have the
K von Holdt ‘South Africa: The Transition to Violent Democracy’ (2013) Review of African Political Economy 590.
Bracking (note 8 above) at 170-71.
15 President Zuma initially applied to block the publication of the report, apparently in the hope that it would be revised
or edited by Madonsela’s successor. He withdraw his application, however, and in November 2016, the Pretoria High
Court ordered the report’s release. L Wolf ‘The Remedial Action of the “State of Capture” Report in Perspective’ (2017)
P.E.R. Report in Perspective 1, 4.
16 Bracking (note 8 above) at 170. Hannah Arendt, in contrast, defined corruption as “when private interests invade the
public domain.” H Arendt On Revolution 2675 (1990).
17 For a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of the pathological tendencies of presidentialism in the African context,
which differ in emphasis, although not in pessimism, see N Van de Walle, N. ‘Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa's
emerging party systems’ (2003) Journal of Modern African Studies 297, and KC Moghalu ‘Africa's Leadership Conundrum’
(2017) Fletcher Forum on World Affairs 171.
18 For an argument to that effect, see M Mkhabela, ‘Zuma may be gone, but how do we avoid a repeat of the disaster?’
News24 (6 September 2018). RW Johnson also blames the specific leadership failures of various ANC presidents.
Johnson, “Cyril Ramaphosa’s poisoned chalice” (note 10 above). The growth of presidential authority may also impede
development of a public culture of democratic expectations and participation. YL Morse ‘Presidential power and
democratization by elections in Africa’ (2018) Democratization 709.
19 For an insightful, and early, argument that the ANC would present a threat to the persistence of constitutional
democracy by dint of its dominance, see H Giliomee, J Myburgh, & L Schlemmer ‘Dominant party rule, opposition
parties and minorities in South Africa’ (2001) Democratization 161, 162.
13
14
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power to marshal and channel resources, and hence defalcate state funds.20 But if widespread
corruption is associated with a particular phrase of economic development, it may not be avoidable
through legal means. And ceasing to develop economically is simply not on the cards.
Third, state capture involves a pervasive failure of integrity on the part of high-level officials.
This is not so much an institutional design problem as a problem of culture. If a sufficiently anomic
attitude suffuses the whole ANC party (which has been in power at the national level and in many
subnational jurisdictions since 1996), it seems quite unlikely that any institutional fix will prevent state
capture. If a sufficient proportion of officials wielding state power are indifferent to the risk to
constitutional democracy, if they become sufficiently inured to the public’s legitimate demands for
effective state functioning for all, and if they are willing to engage in self-serving conduct without
regard to the cost to the nation’s economic and political stability, then it is hard to see how any rule
of constitutional law or institutional device could make a difference. This is not a novel point:
Theorists from Max Weber onward have recognized that a measure of official acceptance and
internalization of legal rules is necessary for the law to have effective force.21 More recently, theorists
of constitutional law have derived from the English legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart the powerful
hypothesis that the legitimacy and stability of a constitutional system depends on the attitudes and
investments of some combination of elites and ordinary citizens.22 Absent these orientations toward
legality and law, no legal system gets off the ground or stays in motion.
But if law rests on the sociological fact of internalization, particularly by state officials, and
upon a positive attitude toward legality, it is circular to call upon law as a solution when that
internalization, and the corresponding official attitudes, fail. Rather, a Weberian (or Hartian) lens
suggests that it may be wiser to cultivate the appropriate sociological conditions in which
internalization occurs than to chisel precisely the corners and edges of government institutions.23
Consider in this regard, the effort of the American constitution’s drafters to elicit certain
“institutional” dispositions on the part of national office holders, as a means of deracinating them
from the fiery passions of factional passion. The Madisonian project of generating institutional
loyalties as a predicate for restraining intragovernmental competition, however, is today considered a
failure by most constitutional theorists.24 There is no contemporary successor to this Madisonian
theory that promises to reinfuse government with integrity and legality through clever constitutional
design. Constitution, we now think, cannot make people good.
Hence, there are ample reasons for doubting the efficacy of law or constitutionalism as a
complete remedy for state capture. Yet this perhaps moves too fast. The conclusion that laws and
institutions are alone insufficient to prevent state capture does not also mean that laws and institutions
A Beresford ‘Power, Patronage, and Gatekeeper Politics in South Africa’ (2015) African Affairs 226, 229-30.
M Weber From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (2013).
22 For a recent recapitulation of this argument, see R Fallon Jr. Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court (2018). For Hart’s
canonical description of law as resting upon the “customary rule of judges and other officials,” see HLA Hart The Concept
of Law (2012), 317.
23 But the idea of cultivating certain dispositions to promote constitutionalism is not entirely alien to constitutional law.
Consider, for example, Philip Bobbitt’s idea of an “ethnical” form of constitutional argument, which “relies on a
characterization of [national] institutions and the role within them of the [national] people.” P Bobbitt Constitutional Fate:
Theory of the Constitution (1982), 95.
24 For a reconsideration of this project, largely associated with James Madison, as well as suggestions as to how it might
be partially redeemed, see D Fontana & AZ Huq, ‘Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law’ (2018) University of
Chicago Law Review 1.
20
21
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cannot ever make a difference. Perhaps they cannot guarantee absolutely that state capture, or some
other threat to constitutional democracy, will not arise. Law, after all, cannot always prevent the
emergence of a dominant party. Nor can it wholly control the forces unleashed by a sudden exposure
to global markets. Nevertheless, law and constitutions might play a role in managing the resulting
threats to democracy. Savvy institutional design might change the rate at which state capture takes
hold, allowing countervailing political forces time to marshal. It might also mitigate the risk of state
capture’s worst-case scenarios. Indeed, the possibility of successful judicial interventions in respect to
social pathologies of a different sort has been posited by Theunis Roux some fifteen years ago. Roux’s
core claim was that the Court had quickly become “adept” in the role of “ legitimator of the postapartheid social transformation project.” The function played by the Court in the decisions under
review here is rather different, but my analysis is consistent with that claim—and might profitably be
read as an extension of Roux’s pathmarking work.25
Another domain in which the role of courts in protecting constitutional democracy is the
recent literature on ‘democratic backsliding.’ 26 This literature crisscrosses law, political science, and
sociology. It aims to understand, and craft effectual responses to, the electoral victories of populist
leaders in Poland, Hungary, Venezuela, Bolivia, Russia, Turkey, and the United States (among other
countries). Many of these leaders have either attempted to dismantle, or succeeded in dismantling, the
likelihood of subsequent democratic rotation. They have neutered checking institutions such as courts
and ombudsmen, and silenced dissenting voices in the media and academia. Their legalistic toolkit is
novel. In the twentieth century, antidemocratic behavior generally took the form of coups or abuses
of emergency powers. Today, democratic backsliding typically takes place within a framework of laws
and constitutional continuity.27 The process of backsliding, moreover, has typically been incremental,
rather than immediate. Decline is a process and not an event.
There are many similarities between the problem of state capture and the prospect of populist
degradation of constitutional norms. Studies of the latter process suggest that legal and institutional
arrangements can be important, if not always decisive, frictions. Legal rules matter because the
processes of institutional decomposition extends over time through the manipulation of legal and
constitutional rules, the details of those rules turn out to be consequential. Constitutional design can
create protective redoubts for political factions committed to democracy and a strong form of the rule
of law. These institutional shelters enable resistance to democratic backsliding that would otherwise
be impossible. Such resistance might not succeed—but without clever constitutional design, it is
simply impossible. This dynamic is most clearly illustrated in in several cases of democratic “near
misses” in countries such as Sri Lanka, Colombia, and Finland. In all those countries, a stable
democratic order has come under sudden attack, but has subsequently recovered. In each of these
three cases, the Constitution or laws created institutional shelter for resistance to backsliding.
Specifically, unelected actors empowered by law to act as election administrators, as judges, or as
military commanders took advantage of their structural independence from direct political control to
oppose backsliding.28 To be sure, the operation of those institutions alone could not alone have saved
25T

Roux ‘Legitimating transformation: political resource allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003)
Democratization 92, 93.
26 The following paragraphs draws upon AZ Huq & T Ginsburg ‘How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy’ (2018)
University of California at Los Angeles Law Review 78; T Ginsburg & AZ Huq How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (2018);
and T Ginsburg & AZ Huq ‘Defining and Tracking the Trajectory of Liberal Constitutional Democracy’ in M Graber, M
Tushnet & S Levinson editors, Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (2018), 29.
27 KL Scheppele ‘Autocratic legalism’ (2018) University of Chicago Law Review 545.
28 T Ginsburg & AZ Huq ‘Democracy’s Near Misses’ (2018) Journal of Democracy.
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democracy. Rather, their intervention created political space for other, democratic forces to organize
successfully, and ultimately prevail in a subsequent election. It is possible that what works to curb
populist backsliding also works to constrain the threat to constitutional democracy from state capture.
This essay explores the possibility that courts can play a role in arresting damage to
constitutional democracy, much as courts have hindered processes of democratic backsliding in other
contexts. To that end, it examines closely four decisions in which the Constitutional Court of South
Africa has responded to state capture as a threat to “constitutional democracy.” Each of these cases
concerns an effort either to stymie one of President Zuma’s efforts to entrench himself, or else an
oppositional effort to oust him from power. One of the four cases was decided after Zuma resigned
in February 2018. I include it here because it concerns Zuma’s prosecutorial appointments, which
were part of his entrenching strategy. These cases are perceived as component parts of an
accountability process. Stu Woolman has argued in these pages that the Constitutional Court was a
key player in a larger political dynamic by which Zuma was “ignominiously” forced from the
presidency.29 That it was a process rather than an event, notwithstanding the early and ample evidence
of Zuma’s improprieties, reflects the ANC’s resistance to accountability, and at times its resistance to
the Constitutional Court itself.30
I consider these four decisions to analyze how they employed the Constitution against state
capture: Did the Court apply a consistent theoretical touchstone in analyzing legal questions? Did it
consistently favor one branch (or one institution within a branch) over others? Was its aim to elicit
solely long-term dynamics? The answer to these questions is no: The Court’s interventions were
methodologically varied; they helped different entities; and they tacked between short-term and longterm effects. Indeed, an overarching lesson to be drawn from these cases is that democracy’s defense
is a tactical, rather than a strategic, challenge. Rather than articulating a singular theory or
jurisprudential decisions, the Court’s decisions are better understood as fluid and contingent responses
to specific political risks. Threats to constitutional democracy are fluid and themselves the results of
strategic action. Hence, it is not surprising that a court seeking to defend democracy pursuant to the
rule of law would be ill-served by a single, fixed theoretical framework. Nor is that goal best served
by a singular effort to defang one “most dangerous” branch.31 Indeed, at certain moments the
appropriate object of reformist attention is not the state at all, but the dominant party’s internal
dynamics. Moreover, the kind of needful remedies will vary from one occasion to the next. At times,
the most needful interventions are local and immediate in effect; at times, they will have little or no
direct effect, but will profoundly alter the strategy opinions for both the defenders and the foes of
constitutional democracy. The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in this field, in short, illustrates
both the possibility and the virtues of a tactical approach to the separation of powers as a safeguard of
constitutional democracy. It shows the virtue of setting deep theoretical principles to one side, and
simply doing what works.

Stu Woolman, ‘A Politics of Accountability: How South Africa’s Judicial Recognition of the Binding Legal Effect of
the Public Protector’s Recommendations Had a Catalyzed Effect that Brought Down a President’ (2015) Constitutional
Court Review 158, 159.Woolman notes that the Court’s ruling “rattled” the ANC’s hegemony and “discernable knock-on
effects.” Id. at 185.
30 On the ANC reaction to the Economic Freedom Fighters decision discussed below, see L Hartwell, ‘Protecting Zuma
versus Protecting the Constitution’ (2016) Southern African Peace and Security Studies 35.
31 For a genealogy and useful repurposing of this concept, see MS Flaherty ‘The most dangerous branch; (1995) Yale Law
Journal 1725.
29
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To be clear, I do not claim that these are the only decisions of the Constitutional Court that in
some fashion have been responsive to the problem of state capture. At other times, the Court has also
struck down legislation that hobbled a key anti-corruption agency32; limited parliamentary delegations
to the presidency to extend the Chief Justice’s term of office33; and overturned a presidential decision
appointing a new National Director of Public Prosecutions.34 The decisions analyzed here are simply
the ones most closely tied to the specific threat to constitutional democracy posed by President Zuma.
I begin by offering a parsimonious definition of “constitutional democracy” drawn from my
earlier work with Tom Ginsburg on the cognate idea of “liberal constitutional democracy.” This
definition supplies a more secure point of reference for analysis. It is broadly consistent with the
concerns raised by Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Madlanga, and helps explain the relationship
between constitutional democracy and corruption. I then turn to the four recent Constitutional Court
decisions touching on state capture and the Zuma presidency, focusing in particular on the way in
which the Court’s interventions relate to the project of maintaining constitutional democracy. These
decisions illustrate the virtue of a tactical separation of powers. I conclude by stepping back briefly and
reflecting on the implications on the (at least temporary) success of the Constitutional Court’s
intervention for the ongoing efforts to theorize the separation of powers as a general constitutional
concept.
Before offering any further analysis, I feel it important to offer an important caveat: I am not
a South African lawyer, and have no particular feel for the fabric of its jurisprudence. Nor (to my
dismay and chagrin) have I had the chance to spend sufficient time in South Africa to be able to claim
any familiarity with the felt political dynamics and patterns of national political life. The analysis that
follows, accordingly, should be understood as reflecting the written products of the Constitutional
Court, as well as the available secondary literature, evaluated from a comparative and theoretical
perspective. I make no pretense, and should be understood as making no pretense, at an evaluation
of the nation’s constitutionalism from an internal perspective.
II.

A Working Definition of Constitutional Democracy

It is useful to begin by offering a thick account of “constitutional democracy.” By using the
term “constitutional democracy,” I believe that Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Madlanga had
something in mind akin to what Tom Ginsburg and I in a recent book call “liberal constitutional
democracy.” Mogoeng and Madlanga are fairly read as implying the broadly ‘liberal’ character of the
constitution, at least in the sense Ginsburg and I use that term. Its omission from their opinions,
therefore, is not a strike against this definitional alignment. The idea of liberal constitutional
democracy, moreover, illuminates the relationship of state capture to the prospect of democracy
backsliding.
In a book and a number of scholarly articles, Ginsburg and I have characterized “liberal
constitutional democracy” terms as comprising three distinct, but interlocking system-level elements.35
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others [2001] ZACC 6, 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC).
Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of Republic of South Africa & Others, Freedom Under Law v President of the Republic of
South Africa & Others, Center for Applied Legal Studies & Another v President of the of the Republic of South Africa & Others [2011]
ZACC 23, 2011 (5) SA 388 (CC).
34 Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others [2012] ZACC 24. 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC).
35 This definition draws on the various works cited in note 26. Our definition was parsimonious because we aimed to
provide a working basis for analyzing the processes of democratic backsliding, and believed that a thicker description
32
33
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The first of these is a democratic electoral system. Most importantly, this involves periodic free-andfair elections in which the modal adult can vote, and after which a losing side concedes power to the
winning side. The second prong of the definition comprises the particular liberal rights to speech and
association that are closely linked to democracy in practice. Without free speech and association, it is
hard to see how opposition parties can coordinate and persuade voters to remove incumbents from
office. Finally, and most unusually, the definition looks for a level of integrity of law and legal
institutions sufficient to allow democratic engagement without fear or coercion. Democracy, we have
argued, requires institutional mechanisms to maintain regularity and legality in elections and media
regulation. It needs a robust, relatively autonomous and professional, bureaucracy to prevent
incumbent self-dealing or entrenchment. This need is particularly acute in respect to institutions that
manage the democratic process and the criminal justice system. These are the parts of the state most
apt to be used unfairly against electoral competitors. Liberal constitutional democracy is thus a systemlevel quality that requires all three of these more precise institutional predicates before getting off the
ground. As a system-level quality, it is not easy to precisely quantify. Part of the difficulty of
quantification flows from the fact that none of the three institutional predicates that we describe are
ever likely to be perfectly achieved. All democracies, however well-functioning, likely fall short in one
way or another ways in respect to these three institutional building blocks. None, however, can work
without a measure of all three of the values we describe. And we think it is plausible to make judgments
about the existence and direction of liberal constitutional democracy, even if the latter cannot be
precise measured.
Once constitutional democracy is defined in this fashion, the link to state capture intimated
by Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Madlanga becomes easier to see. Endemic corruption is causally
related to systemic and disabling dysfunctions in the basic democratic mechanisms that link the public
to the state.36 State capture’s evisceration of the administrative rule of law in turn undermines both
liberal rights and the possibility of fair elections by fostering a violent democracy in which the lawenforcement institutions cannot be trusted.
Consider a number of ways in which this can happen. First, state capture undermines the
efficacy of channels linking public preferences to political choices. Most generally, a government that
is unable to satisfy the basic demands of its citizens for public goods such as public safety,
macroeconomic stability, and services such as power and water is not a government that can sustain
confidence in democracy as a system. Catastrophic economic mismanagement create conditions for
democratic backsliding. Economic crises since the Great Depression have been linked to the rise of
anti-democratic populist movements.37 On gaining power, populist parties tend to dismantle many of
democracy’s necessary institutional supports by removing checks on executive power, hobbling courts
and oversight bodies, and capturing the free press and the academy.38 Indeed, as discussed above, this
is precisely what has happened in many nations since the recession of 2008-09.
Even if populists do not directly seize power, state capture can inflict a blizzard of small, but
cumulatively crippling, harms to democracy. The result is democratic death by a thousand cuts. A
courted the risk of becoming mired in the extended, and perhaps interminable, debates over what should count as a
democracy.
36 This is a theme in S Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (2001), and D della Porta
& A Vannucci, Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms (1999).
37 Barry Eichengreen, The Populist Temptation: Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era (2018).
38 AZ Huq ‘The People Versus the Constitution’ (2018) Michigan Law Review 1123.
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political landscape of endemic corruption is thus incompatible with the motivational bases of
democratic participation because it works an “unjustified disempowerment” of citizens who are not
direct beneficiaries of ongoing graft.39 Where people cease to believe that public decisions are based
on public-regarding reasons, as opposed to private gain, they become disillusioned with the process
of democratic debate and persuasion.40 The public sphere is also robbed of its function when its
participants come to believe that their arguments no longer have any connection to the actual exercise
of state power. In addition, state capture motivates a dominant party to adopt rhetorical tactics that
degrade further the relationship between the public and its elected representation. For example, the
ANC has employed rhetorical tropes that demonize whites to sustain public support in the absence
of any concrete policy achievements, and against the backdrop of collapsing public services.41 In
Zimbabwe, such tactics have led to violence and dispossession. While the risk of overt violence against
whites as a consequence of this sort of political rhetoric is hard to quantify, the illiberal torqueing of
public debate makes it more difficult for the polity will be able to focus upon matters of real public
importance. Indeed, the whole point of ginning up anger at foreign elites is to distract the public from
deep failures of governance. Such ‘democratic pollution’ presents arguably as a great a risk to the
possibility of democratic rotation as formal, legal censorship. Just as much as a prior restraint, it
impedes the effective operation of public debate and political association.42
In sum, different threats to liberal constitutional democracy target distinct elements of its
tripartite institutional foundation. State capture, understood as an acutely endemic species of
corruption, undermines directly the administrative rule of law and corrodes the quality of the public
sphere. In so doing, it directly and indirectly saps the efficacy of both fair elections and also liberal
rights of speech and association. As Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Madlanga suggested, the South
African example is an important reminder of the pluralism of democracy’s institutional foundations,
and the manner in which default in one local domain can have concatenating, systemic consequences
for democracy as a whole.
III.

The Constitutional Court Confronts State Capture: Four Perspectives

In four recent cases, the Constitutional Court has addressed questions about the allocation of
institutional power between and within the branches of the national government.43 These cases have
arisen in the context of contestation over how (and for whom) state power is exercised. In particular,
they all concern President Zuma’s efforts to remain in office despite allegations of misconduct. The
decisions were all steps in a larger process that led to President Zuma’s departure from office in
February 2018. Other elements of the process had nothing to do with the courts. For example, Zuma’s
March 2017 effort to install “a tame Gupta protégé” as finance minister was taken as a “clear sign that
even the national Treasury was about to be looted,” and led to an overnight collapse in the value of
the Rand. It brought businesses, trade unions, and the Communist Party into accord that Zuma had

Ibid 329.
Mark E. Warren, ‘What does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?’ (2004) American Journal of Political Science 328, 328-29.
41 For examples, see Bracking (note 8 above) at 171.
42 Tim Wu has argued that effective political control is achieved more effectively through polluting the public sphere
than by formal censorship legible as such. T Wu ‘Is the First Amendment Obsolete?’ (2017) Knight Institute Emerging
Threats Series. Wu focuses on the ability of internet content providers to manipulate users’ attention. The form of
democratic pollution with which I am concerned here is somewhat different in form and vector.
43 I do not address questions concerning the role of the provinces under the Constitution. Cf J Wehner ‘Fiscal
Federalism in South Africa’ (2000) Publius 47.
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to be dispatched.44 The subsequent publication of the “State of Capture” report also catalyzed street
protests with “huge crowds of trade unionists and workers … chanting anti-Zuma slogans in the street
and demanding his resignation.”45 Still, informed commentators underscore the important role that
the Constitutional Court’s decisions played in the lead-up to Zuma’s fall. Johnson, for example,
explicitly links the Court’s ruling on the Public Protector—discussed in greater detail below—with the
ANC’s subsequent defeats in local elections in Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, and Pretoria.46 Given
that commentators have sometimes described the Court as otherwise aligned with many of the ANC’s
policy preferences,47 its role here is all the more noteworthy.
This Part examines the ways in which the Court interpreted the South African constitution’s
division of powers between branches and other institutions in order to promote constitutional
democracy in particular in the crucial two years prior to Zuma’s resignation in February 2018. I discuss
four cases below. Three of them precede Zuma’s fall. The fourth followed that event, but was deeply
implicated in Zuma’s fate, and reflects an effort to unravel the pernicious elements of his legacy. How
in these cases, I ask, did the Court further the cause of constitutional democracy? What kind of vision
of the institutional relations of constitutional bodies underwrote its decisions? By examining decisions
that were part of a successful defense against democratic backsliding, I hope to offer insight into the
role that courts can play in shoring up constitutional democracy.
As a threshold matter, it is worth underscoring that the opinions discussed in this part are
consistent with a longer jurisprudential trajectory in which the Constitutional Court has approached
the separation of powers in a purposive manner that combines doctrinal and methodological
suppleness with an eye for larger, systemic ends. In the First Certification Judgment, for example, the
Court refused to endorse the static, rigid, and textualist approach, and instead embraced an approach
that emphasized functional principles that could emerge through applications and the workings of
institutional life.48 The separation of powers in South African law, it explained “evidence[s] a concern
for both the over-concentration of power and the requirement or energetic and effective, yet
answerable, executive”49 It was, the Court later elaborated, “a delicate balancing, informed both by
South Africa’s history and its new dispensation” between restraining and enabling impulses.50 The
same idea was endorsed again in 2001 and then in 2002.51 Anticipating some of the themes in the cases
discussed below, the Court has also vigorously endorsed the functional independence of Chapter IX
institutions from “national executive control” such that “they should be and should manifestly be seen
to be outside government.”52 In short, there is a precedential foundation for the approach followed in
these four cases. What is of interest is therefore not the fact of doctrinal novation, but how this
“distinctively” South African approach has been adopted to the question of state capture.
Johnson (note 4 above) at 39.
Bracking (note 8 above) at 172.
46 Johnson (note 4 above) at 39.
47 T Roux ‘Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa’ (2009) International Journal of
Constitutional Law 106, 138.
48 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996, [1996] ZACC 26, 1996 (4) SA 744, at para 111. The Court also said that “the separation of powers doctrine
is … given expression in many different forms and made subject to checks and balances of different kinds.” Ibid.
49 Ibid. at 112.
50 De Lange v Smuts NO and Others (CCT26/97) [1998] ZACC 6; 1998 (3) SA 785.
51 S v Dodo (CCT 1/01) [2001] ZACC 16; 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC), at para 17, and S and Others v Van Rooyen and
Others, [2002] ZACC 8; 2002 (5) SA 246, at para 34.
52 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality (CCT 49/00) [2001] ZACC 23; 2001 (3) SA 925, at para
31.
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1.

Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly

The first case, Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly, arose from the removal of
members of the Economic Freedom Fighters party from the National Assembly’s chamber during
President Zuma’s State of the Nation address on 12 February 2015.53 The issue before the Court was
the validity of Section 11 of the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial
Legislatures Act 4 of 2004. This was the statutory authority pursuant to which the Speaker of the
National Assembly ordered the parliamentarians’ removal. The petitioner in the case, a parliamentary
party opposed to the ANC, argued that section 11 was a violation of the separation of powers.54
Refusing to rely upon the 2000 Hyundai decision’s preference for reading legislation as within
constitutional,55 Justice Madlanga held for a majority of the Court held that Section 11 had been
correctly read to allow the removal of members of the legislature. This broad reach, however, had a
“chilling effect” upon parliamentary free speech, and also “directly infringe[d] the immunities from
criminal proceedings, arrest and imprisonment enjoyed by members” pursuant to sections 58(1)(b)
and 71(1)(b) of the Constitution.56 Complementing this rights-based line of reasoning, the Court also
offered a structural argument that took up the petitioner’s invitation to consider the separation of
powers.57 The aforementioned sections of the Constitution setting forth the privileges of
parliamentarians, the Court explained, need not be read to allow for unlimited disruption by members
intent on derailing legislative proceedings. But they did imply that the regulation of cameral speech
had to be done by the relevant House itself, and not by an Act of Parliament.58 This reading, on my
understanding, rested heavily on textual evidence rather than any functional analysis of allocating
power at the cameral rather than the parliamentary level. On these grounds, the Court found that
February 2015 removal had been unlawful.
It is worth emphasizing that there were a number of paths open to the Court: It could have
obviously reached a different result, but it could also have avoided the separation of powers issued
raised and decided in Justice Madlanga’s majority opinion. For example, it might have accepted the
Hyundai-based argument for construing section 11 narrowly. Concurring in the judgment, Justices Jafta
and Nkabinde indeed took this view.59 This would yielded a similar bottom line. But it would also have
left open the possibility of new legislation—although Justice Jafta’s opinion intimated that substitute
legislation of greater clarity would be “unconstitutional.” Perhaps as importantly, it would also have
vitiated the Court’s opportunity to make a more general pronouncement on parliamentary free speech
and also the separation of powers.60 The opinion’s effects on elite and public might, as a result, have
been quite different.
‘South African parliament chaos as Malema MPs heckle Zuma,’ BBC News (12 February 2015).
Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, [2016] ZACC 8; 2016 2016 (3) SA 487, at para 7.
55 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others In re: Hyundai
Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others (CCT1/00) [2000] ZACC 12; 2000; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at
para 23.
56 Democratic Alliance (note 54 above) at paras 41 and 42.
57 The Court, however, declined to consider or decide whether the challenged provision was “at variance with the
separation of powers doctrine.” Democratic Alliance (note 54 above) at para 53. Nevertheless, the structural implications of
the decisions are sufficiently clear that it is appropriate to include here.
58 Democratic Alliance (note 54 above) at para 47.
59 Democratic Alliance (note 54 above) at para 82.
60 One of the anonymous readers of this article objects to this gloss on Democratic Alliance, arguing that it should be
viewed as a more narrowly textual and legalist decision.
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On the merits, one can also easily imagine a different result. In respect to the separation of
powers element of the case, indeed, it is noteworthy that American constitutional law has taken a
different tack.61 The U.S. Congress has enacted statutes that contain rules of cameral procedure since
the 1790s, for instance to provide expedited consideration of trade treaties and otherwise to fashion
frameworks for expedited legislative consideration of time-sensitive policy considerations.62 One legal
scholar has developed a powerful argument for the position that Article I, Section 7 of the U.S.
Constitution, which endows each branch with power to set its own rules, renders such statute-based
imposition of cameral rules unconstitutional, much in the spirit of the Democratic Alliance opinion.63
Yet his position remains a minority one. The argument for permitting statutory rules of legislative
procedure, moreover, is arguably stronger in South Africa than in the U.S. context. Under the
American Constitution, both the Houses and also the President normally play a role in the legislative
process. Under Article 75 and related provisions of the South African Constitution, the president must
generally assent, and has only a limited power to return laws.64 Hence, there is no argument in the
South African context (as there is in the U.S. context) that the executive has shaped cameral rules.
Note also the distinctive way in which Democratic Alliance was a separation-of-powers decision.
The decision does allocates authority between different institutions created by the Constitution, But
it does not move power between the branches. Rather, it shifts authority largely held by the parliament
(with the exception of certain constraints in Article 79) to the level of the single chamber.65 The effects
of this alternation of institutional relationships is ambiguous and complex, In the short term (i.e., the
context of the particular decision), it benefited the plaintiff Economic Freedom Fighters and
Democratic Alliance, who could not be sanctioned for past protests within the ANC-dominated
legislature. In the longer term, however, the separation-of-powers element of the decision created a
temporary speedbump to the imposition of such punishments but did not make it more difficult to
regulate parliamentary speech. To the contrary, all else being equal, it ought to be easier for a single
chamber to enact (and also to repeal) rules limiting or punishing such speech than for the two
chambers acting together. In particular, where one party dominates a particular chamber, it seems
likely that it will not be constrained in silencing the minority’s protests. The free speech component
of Democratic Alliance, moreover, does not appear to impose much of a constraint on a cameral majority.
The majority opinion here suggests that a chamber cannot “denude the privilege of its essential
content.”66 But the precise meaning of this ambiguous limiting language is hard to predict.
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to infer that the short-term effect of Democratic Alliance—which was

I offer the U.S. experience merely as a point of comparison; I do not mean to suggest that merely because the U.S.
courts have decided a question one way, that is the correct way to decide the issue.
62 For a careful study of the uses of such framework legislation, see E Garrett ‘The purposes of framework legislation’
(2004) Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 717.
63 AA Bruhl ‘Using Statues to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of the
Proceedings Clause’ (2003) Journal of Law and Politics 345, 345-49.
64 Under Article 79, the President may refer a bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration. If the reconsidered
bill accommodates the President’s reservations, the President must assent to and sign the bill. If a reconsidered measure
does not fully accommodate the President’s reservations, the President must either assent to and sign the Bill or refer it
to the Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality. If the Constitutional Court decides the bill is
constitutional, the President must sign it.
65 The National Assembly’s power to promulgate internal rules, for examples, is described in Article 59(1)(b).
66 Democratic Alliance (note 54 above) at para 39. In the previous paragraph, the majority states that the privilege “can
never go so far as to give members a license so [as] to disrupt the proceedings of Parliament.” Hence, it appears that the
Court envisages some constraint on parliamentary free speech as well as cameral power. Precisely how to delineate these
domain lines is quite unclear.
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to affirm as lawful (and hence subtly to legitimate) a protest against President Zuma—may well be
more important that its uncertain long-term implications.
2.

Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others

The second important decision of this period concerning corruption and state capture,
Economic Freedom Fighter v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others,67 pertains to the Public Protector’s
report on President Zuma’s spending on a private resident in Nklandia. In particular, it turns on the
question whether the Public Protector’s recommendations to the president and the National Assembly
pursuant to section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution were binding or precatory. Stu Woolman has argued,
the Economic Freedom Fighters decision is a key “part of the Constitutional Court’s ongoing efforts to
keep the train on the tracks – by ensuring that the state, specific state actors, and ‘well-connected’
private actors abide by the rule of law and are held accountable both to the Constitution and the
people they serve.”68 The question addressed here is precisely how the Court pursued these goals. After
all, it is not entirely clear how “rule of law” values inform a judicial decision as to which of a number
of plausible readings of the law to adopt.69 Nor is it self-evident how accountability should be defined.
Mechanisms of accountability come in both legalistic and democratic forms.70 A surfeit of such
mechanisms in a constitution can generate perverse and even undesirable outcomes.71 Both the vector
and the appropriate quantum of accountability appropriate to preserve constitutional democracy must
therefore be analyzed with some precision.
The Nkandla residence of Jacob Zuma is located in KwaZulu Natal. It became an epicenter
of public controversy as a result of publicly-funded security upgrade ultimately costing some R246
million. The improvements to the property included a helipad, underground bunkers, facilities for
security and their accommodation, a firepool, a chicken-run, and fencing around the entire complex.
In 2013, Public Protector Thuli Madonsela released a report on the Nkandla spending entitled “Secure
in Comfort”—the provisional, perhaps more telling, title had been “Opulence on a Grand Scale.” The
report concluded that the improvements went well beyond the security-related alterations permitted
by law; that Zuma had substantially benefited from the improvements; and that he was obligated to
repay the state a reasonable amount of the resulting costs.72 Prior to the release of the Public
Protector’s final report, the parliamentary ANC had also initiated its own investigation of the Nkandla
spending. Rather unsurprisingly, this cleared Zuma of any impropriety.73 For a year after the Public
Protector’s report had been submitted, a stalemate ensued. Neither the president nor the parliament
took any steps to implement it. This triggered ultimately applications by the Economic Freedom
Fighter and Democratic Alliance parties seeking an order compelling those branches to take remedial

[2016] ZACC 11; (3) SA 580 (CC).
S Woolman (note 29 above) at 174-75; ibid at 159 (offering further reflections on that topic).
69 The ‘rule of law’ can be defined in terms of constitutional law in a number of different ways; some are thin in the
sense of providing little or no guidance as to the substantive content of the law. RH Fallon Jr ‘The rule of law" as a
concept in constitutional discourse’ (1997) Columbia Law Review 1.
70 AZ Huq ‘Legal or Political Checks on Apex Criminality: An Essay on Constitutional Design’ (2018) University of
California at Los Angeles Law Review 4.
71 Democratic accountability can conduce to undesirable failures to account for minority interests. E Maskin & J Tirole
‘The politician and the judge: Accountability in government’ (2004) American Economic Review 1034; see also JE Gersen &
MC Stephenson ‘Over-accountability’ (2014) Journal of Legal Analysis 185.
72 ‘Nkandla: It's still opulence on a grand scale’ Mail & Guardian (20 March 2014).
73 ‘Nkandla: Nxesi explains why security upgrade was essential’ Mail & Guardian (19 December 2013).
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actions, including determining the reasonable cost of the nonsecurity measures and paying back to the
state a reasonable percentage of that cost.74
The Constitutional Court held first that it had jurisdiction over the complaints lodged by those
two parties because they had alleged that both the President and the National Assembly had “breached
their respective constitutional obligations” in a matter of “high political importance.”75 The allegation
that the President had personally failed to meet a constitutional obligation was pivotal to the Court’s
analysis. In the course of this analysis, the Court again recognized that it was wading into “sensitive
areas of separation of powers.” 76 Indeed, the sensitivity of the underlying questions was in part a
justification for its exercise of jurisdiction.
On the merits, the Court began by adumbrating the justifications for Chapter IX institutions
such as the Public Protector office. It described that office in particular as “invaluable”77 To fulfil its
role in combating corruption, graft, and other forms of impropriety, the Court explained, the Public
Protector (like other Chapter IX institutions) had constitutionally guarantees of “independence,
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness.”78 Chief Justice Mogoeng then offered the simple yet
devastating observation that unless the Public Protector had power to determine conclusively the
appropriate remedies for official misconduct, “very few” of the apex legislative and executive officials
subject to her jurisdiction would ever comply with those recommendations.79 The mandatory force of
her remedial conclusions, therefore, followed from the functional necessity of binding remedies in a
context where compliance was typically incentive incompatible.80
Turning to the legal force of the Public Protector’s proposed remedies, the Court categorically
rejected the notion that, in the absence of judicial review and constraint, they were advisory. A
functional logic again played a key role here. As Chief Justice Mogoeng explained, “one cannot talk
about remedial action unless a remedy in the true sense is provided to address a complaint in a
Earlier precedent from the Supreme Court of Appeals had suggested that the legislative and executive branches were
under an obligation to respect the Public Protector’s rulings. Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation
Limited [2014] ZAWCHC 131, 2015 (1) SA 551, at paras 52-53.
75 Economic Freedom Fights (note 67 above) at para 24.
76 Ibid at para 19. The idea that the sensitivity of the issue and the personal involvement of the president created
jurisdiction is almost the inverse of the standard view of jurisdictional constraints in American constitutional law. In U.S.
jurisprudence, the closer a question is to the apex of political power, and the more neuralgic the question, the less likely
the U.S. Supreme Court is to address the matter (or to evince a form of deference that is functionally indistinguishable
from the eschewal of jurisdiction). The U.S. position is usually justified on grounds on expertise and democratic
legitimacy. But neither reason is persuasive. There is no real difference between the questions of law and policy that arise
when the Court declines jurisdiction and that arise in regulatory disputes the Court routinely adjudicates. And it is
implausible to think that democratic accountability will be effective when the executive controls the information
available to the public about the success, and the costs, or a policy. AZ Huq ‘Structural Constitutionalism as CounterTerrorism’ (2012) California Law Review 887.
77 Economic Freedom Fights (note 67 above) at para 52.
78 Ibid at para 50.
79 Ibid at paras 56 and 64. In subsequent sections of the opinion, Chief Justice Mogoeng addressed and rejected the
argument that sections 182(1) and 182(2) of the Constitution allowed the National Assembly to impose legislative
restraints on the Public Protector’s actions. This is, however, in essence a response to a counterargument, rather than a
positive justification for the Chapter IX power at issue in the case.
80 A potential counterargument is that the Public Protector’s reports would be followed because of public pressure on
the president. See E Posner & A Vermeule ‘The Credible Executive’ (2007) University of Chicago Law Review 865. This is
not, so to speak, a credible argument, even if it were not belied by the facts. Chief executives can often mitigate public
pressure from accountability institutions by attacking those institutions as corrupt, or by ginning up political distractions.
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meaningful way.”81 And in rejecting the reasoning of an earlier High Court decision, Chief Justice
Mogoeng underscored the “irrationality” of allowing alleged malefactors to decide on whether they
should comply with the Public Protector’s recommendation. Such a posture, the Court explained,
would be “at odds with the rule of law.”82 Its explanation for this last point, however, rested on the
arguably circular assumption that the Public Protector’s recommendations constituted “law” of the
relevant kind.83
The ensuing opinion did not endorse legislative (cameral) or executive authority. To the
contrary, it affirmed the authority of pivotal Chapter IX institution against the interests of both the
legislative and the executive branch. This affirmation also came after the Public Protector had
published her bombshell “State of Capture” report. It would be very surprising if the decision did not
also influence both public and official perceptions of the latter document. Hence, like Democratic
Alliance, the opinion in Economic Freedom Fighters likely had the immediate practical effect of advancing
the political agenda of those who sought to constrain a hegemonic presidency. But unlike Democratic
Alliance, the Economic Freedom Fighters decision rested on a functional analysis of institutional powers
rather than a close reading of a specific constitutional text. The key term in Chief Justice Mogoeng’s
logic, as I read the case, concerned the (correct) recognition that officials fingered for graft by the
public protector are likely to resist, or at least slow-walk in the face of graft allegations. Nothing in the
text of the Constitution conveys this assumption. Indeed, the textual recognition of broad legislative
authority to regulate the Public Protector at least in some ways in sections 182(1) and 182(2) of the
Constitution arguably cut in the other direction. Hence, Economic Freedom Fighters reflects a very
different strategy of constitutional interpretation than Democratic Alliance. Had the latter’s textualism
been applied, perhaps a different outcome would have ensued.
The opinions’ practical effect, moreover, diverge in an interesting way. In the Nkandla
controversy, President Zuma had already agreed to the measures suggested by the Public Protector
(to be sure under the shadow of constitutional litigation).84 Had the opinion come out the other way,
it is at least possible that he would still have carried out these steps. Perhaps it would have been too
embarrassing for him not to. Hence, it is at least possible to gloss the Court’s conclusion as merely
confirming an existing political equilibrium. Even if one concludes that Zuma would have reneged on
his earlier promise, though, the immediate effect of the opinion was relatively limited. The Nkandla
Economic Freedom Fights (note 67 above) at paras 64, 65, and 68 (“Remedial action must … be suitable and
effective.”). Again, the disjunct between South African and American constitutional law is as striking as it is stark. In
recent American constitutional jurisprudence, the supply of remedies for individual rights’ violations has gradually been
constrained to the point where only the most gross and intentional transgressions of long-established law generate any
kind of a judicial response. For an analysis of the relevant cases, andan exploration of the sociocultural context of these
cases, see AZ Huq & G Lakier ‘Apparent Fault’ (2018) Harvard Law Review 1525, and AZ Huq ‘Judicial Independence
and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies’ (2015) Duke Law Journal 1. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has been
far more willing to permit the litigants to invoke structural principles, even when doing so has no clear causal
relationship to the values the Court purportedly wishes to vindicate. AZ Huq ‘Removal as a Political Question’ (2013)
Stanford Law Review 1. The net result of these postures is a highly regressive doctrinal structure.
82 Economic Freedom Fighters (note 67 above) at para 72. Woolman notes that the Court was in fact arrogating to itself the
power to determine what remedies pressed by Title IX institutions are valid. Woolman (note 29 above) at 190. The
decision hence might be read as an endorsement and enlargement of judicial power as opposed to a constraint on
corruption.
83 The circularity arises because the Court assumes that that the Public Protector’s recommended remedies are a
“decision or step sanctioned as law” that cannot be “ignored based purely on a contrary view.” Economic Freedom
Fights (note 67 above) at para 75. But this is to assume the legal force of those recommendations—which is precisely the
legal question at the pivot of the case.
84 Economic Freedom Fights (note 67 above) at para 100.
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graft, while hardly trivial, is hardly significant in comparison to the pattern of wholesale state capture
associated with the Gupta family, a pattern that still imperils the nation’s fiscal standing. Rather, it
seems more plausible to gloss its opinion in dynamic terms: Elected actors, and in particular ANC
officials, would know on a going forward basis that they had a legal obligation of compliance with the
Public Protector’s recommendations. That this ruling occurred in the context of the state capture
controversy is a fact that should not be forgotten.
Consistent with this understanding, Ros Dixon and Theunis Roux argue in a forthcoming
book chapter that the Court’s Economic Freedom Fights judgment embodied a precise, almost surgical,
intervention that mitigated temporarily the systemic threat to democracy posed by state capture. They
emphasize rightly that the Court alone would have insufficient authority to stem that threat
completely. Rather, they describe the Court’s continued, if incremental, efficacy as a friction on
democratic backsliding.85 Dixon and Roux underscore the long-term nature of the conflict between
the ANC and the Court, praising the latter for its strategic foresight in placing out of bounds a strategy
of noncompliance with Title IX institutions. Dixon and Roux might have added that this insurance
against lawlessness was not without its own flaws. If Public Protector reports cannot be ignored safely
any more, the premium upon appointing captured loyalists to a leadership position in that office rises.86
That is, even if the Court’s intervention limited state control, its effect likely had a shelf-life: Its efficacy
would evaporate when the hegemonic party captured the Public Protector itself.
3.

United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly

The third case of interest here arises out of parliamentary maneuvering in response to
President Zuma’s March 2017 decision to fire five cabinet members, including finance minister Pravin
Gordham and his deputy Ncebisi Jonas. As noted, this was the personnel decision that resulted in a
downgrading of South African sovereign debt.87 The United Democratic Movement party requested
that the Speaker of the National Assembly permit a secret ballot on a motion of no confidence in
Zuma. Its leader Bantu Holomisa argued that a secret ballot was appropriate one was used by the
National Assembly to appoint the president. He also argued that ANC members would be subject to
discipline and even expulsion if they did not support their president.88 In response, the Speaker
concluded that she had no authority under the Constitution and the Rules of the National Assembly
to permit a secret ballot. The United Democratic Movement, along with the Economic Freedom
Fighters, the Inkartha Freedom Party and the Congress of the People, filed an application with the
Constitutional Court seeking a declaration that the Speaker had erred, and that secret ballots were
allowed under the Constitution in no-confidence motions.89
R Dixon & T Roux, ‘Making Constitutional Transitions: The Law and Politics of Constitutional Transitions in South
Africa’ in T Ginsburg & AZ Huq, eds. From Parchment to Practice: Challenges of Implementing New Constitutions (forthcoming
2019).
86 Stu Woolman notes that the Court likely had in mind the Directorate of Special Operations, or Scorpions, which the
government had successfully undermined. S Woolman (note 29 above) at 175.
87 N Onisha & S Chan ‘Firing of South Africa’s Finance Minister Widens a Political Rift’ New York Times (31 March
2017).
88 M Gallens ‘Secret Ballot in Vote of No Confidence Will Protect ANC MPs – Says UDM’ News24 (April 10, 2017).
Many ANC senior figures, including Ramaphosa, had criticized the firings. Onisha & Chan (note 87 above). It is difficult
to know, however, whether this would have licensed rank-and-file members to vote freely in a more consequential noconfidence motion.
89 United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT89/17) [2017] ZACC 21; 2017; 2017 (5) SA
300 (CC) at paras 18 and 19.
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The Court rejected the Speaker’s judgment that she lacked authority to conduct a secret ballot.
It returned the matter to the Speaker to determine how to proceed in light of that authority. Chief
Justice Mogoeng’s opinion begins with a strikingly long introductory essay on the separation of
powers, and in particular on the role of parliament as an institutional site for “accountability-ensuring
mechanisms.”90 This introduction signaled the Court’s cognizance of the broader political context of
its decision. The Court in particular homed in on the question of the efficacy of accountability
mechanisms.91 Although it did not say that judgments of efficacy must account for contemporaneous
political context, this seems implicit in its discussion. A contextual approach to efficacy was also
implicit in its extended discussion of no-confidence motions under section 102 of the Constitution. It
characterized these as a “crucial consequence-management or good-governance” issue necessary to
ensure the “effectiveness of existing mechanisms, in-between the general elections” to articulate
“dissatisfaction” with executive conduct.92 The Court, in short, organized its analysis around the
pragmatic question of efficacy in a way that invites, and perhaps even compels, a contextual and
situated judgment of contemporaneous political circumstances.
All this threshold analysis, however, had strikingly little to do with the actual holding of the
case. This turned, as in Democratic Alliance, on a relatively simple point of textual analysis. Section 57(1)
gives the National Assembly power to “make rules and orders concerning its business” and does not
mention either secret or open balloting, the Court observed. Therefore, the Constitution permitted
both secret and open balloting, pace the Speaker’s assumption of no authority.93 Although the Court
offered some comments on the benefits of a secret ballot in the context of a no-confidence motion,
it is hard to read these stray thoughts as anything more than supplementing its central, textual ground
of decision.94 This textual reading, it should be underscored, could have been reached without any of
the anticipatory paraphernalia of the decision. The result is an opinion with a slightly bathetic note.
The principal effect of the United Democratic Movement decision, like that of Democratic Alliance,
quickly materialized. A vote of no-confidence using a secret ballot, which Zuma narrowly survived,
was ultimately held in August 2017.95 Even if that vote was not decisive, Zuma and his allies had
struggled mightily to avoid it. The narrowness of the vote margin, moreover, demonstrated the extent
to which Zuma and his allies had lost support within the parliamentary ANC party. That information,
aired publicly by the vote, likely weakened Zuma further because it increased the likelihood that
wavering ANC members would ‘defect’ from his caucus, and openly resist his presidency.
Paradoxically, therefore, the secrecy of the no-confidence vote allowed legislators to generate a
credible public signal of the extent of dissatisfaction with the Zuma presidency in a way that lowered
the anticipated costs of defecting from that regime subsequently. It thus anticipated, and rendered
more likely, Zuma’s ultimate February 2018 ouster.
Ibid at paras 1 to 10. In paragraph 33, the Court reiterated theme of accountability and the “reality that constitutional
office-bearers occupy their positions of authority on behalf of and for the common good of people.” The very repetition
of this (by then plainly) counterfactual “reality” works to underscore the Court’s cognizance of the contemporary
political conjunction.
91 Ibid at para 12. The theme is repeated in paragraph 40, which suggests a constitutional obligation to have “effective
mechanisms in place” to hold “Members of the Executive accountable.”
92 Ibid at para 47.
93 Ibid at paras 58 to 61. The Court further held ion paragraph 67 that the Speaker had erred in reading the relevant
National Assembly rules not to allow for secret balloting.
94 Ibid at paras 73 to 76.
95 S Allison ‘Jacob Zuma narrowly survives no-confidence motion in South African parliament’ The Guardian (9 August
2017).
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The decision will also have some enduring consequences. In the longer term, the decision
means that a dominant majority party such as the ANC cannot use the veil of parliamentary secrecy
to shield, and so ignore, fissures within its own coalition as a way to prevent the ouster of incumbent
ministers or presidents. The effect of the decision, therefore is not so much to shift power from one
branch to another. It is instead to reallocate authority from the party in government to the more
diffuse parliamentary party. In the context of a “dominant party” system of a kind that has become
prevalent across Sub-Saharan African,96 this shuffling of intraparty power—with its concomitant
implication of a less concentrated form of parastatal political power—is perhaps a more deeply
significant institutional change than is ready apparent.97
One way to theorize the United Democratic Movement decision is in light of the ‘focal point’
account of constitutional enforcement developed by the political scientist Barry Weingast and others.98
On Weingast’s account, constitutional rules provide crisp and readily available focal points that act as
a signal to diffuse and uncoordinated social and political actors with a signal to the effect that
democratic norms are imperiled. The absence of a focal point will render popular and oppositional
resistance to the antidemocratic consolidation of political power more costly to organize and hence
less effective. Weingast’s theory concerns the content of constitutional rules themselves, rather than
their implications for parliamentary voting rules. But it can be extended to cover the logic of the United
Democratic Movement decision: By facilitating a motion of no-confidence, that is, the Court enabled
opponents of an entrenched presidential clique to discover their own numerosity. By facilitating the
disclosure of this information, the decision lowered epistemic barriers to increased coordination
among political opponents of an incumbent president to check his or her power.
4.

Corruption Watch NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa

One final decision is worth mentioning even thought it was heard some two weeks after Zuma
had resigned, and was not handled down for another six months. The Corruption Watch case
nevertheless concerned Zuma’s efforts while in office to remove former National Director of Public
Prosecutions Mxolisi Nxasana by offering him a large financial settlement conditional on his departure
from the position, and to install in his place Shaun Abrahams.99 Because the case arose out to Zuma’s
effort to obtain greater control over accountability mechanisms, it is related to the ongoing process of
state capture. The decision also raises the same question of how to craft institutional rules to respond
to the prospect of state capture. Hence, it makes sense to treat the case as part of the same
jurisprudence.
The language and result of the case also betray a concern with state capture. The Court held
that section 179(4) of the Constitution guaranteed the independence of the prosecuting authority as a
There are a number of different definitions of “dominant party” system that have been applied in the Sub-Saharan
African context, although the ANC fits all of them. For a survey of the relevant work, see M Bogaards ‘Counting parties
and identifying dominant party systems in Africa’ (2004) European Journal of Political Research 173.
97 The relationship between formal constitutional structures and political party systems is usefully explored in S
Gardbaum ‘Political Parties, Voting Systems, and the Separation of Powers’ (2017) American Journal of Comparative Law
229.
98 BR Weingast BR ‘The political foundations of democracy and the rule of the law’ (1997) American Political Science Review
245.
99 Corruption Watch NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; Nxasana v Corruption Watch NPC and
Others (CCT 333/17; CCT 13/18) [2018] ZACC 23 (13 August 2018).
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safeguard against the risk of political capture by “criminals … holding positions of influence.”100
Concluding that Zuma had sought to “get rid of Mr. Nxasana at all costs,” Justice Madlanga explained
for the Court that “effectively buying out” the Director of Public Prosecutions constituted an
improper infringement on that office’s independence.101 He further held that Abrahams’s appointment
was as a result “constitutionally invalid.”102
Corruption Watch is the only one of these four decisions that deals directly with the authority of
the president under the Constitution. It sharply narrows that authority in the cause of democracy. Its
reasoning sounds in the same functionalist and consequentialist register as United Democratic Movement.
Indeed, it is not impossible to imagine judges reasoning that Nxasana’s decision to accept the financial
offer from Zuma meant that his department could not be construed as a termination, but rather as a
voluntary action. The Court (correctly, in my view) recognized that the course of dealing between
Zuma and Nxasana was salient to an understanding of the latter’s final decision, and declined to
analyze their deal formalistically. But this could thus not be taken for granted. Again, the U.S. courts’
tendency to view the question of removal authority in formalist terms stands in telling contrast.103
Given the timing of the hearing and ultimate resolution of the case, of course, the decision
could have had no direct impact on Zuma’s continued ability to hold and wield power. Indeed, it is
plausible to speculate that Zuma’s fall provided a formative backdrop to the Court’s deliberations.
Rather, the effect of the Corruption Watch decision will be felt during later presidencies. Subsequent
holders of the office will lack an important tool for controlling the progress of criminal investigations
of their own conduct, or that of close allies.
4.

The Tactical Challenge of Preserving Constitutional Democracy

The four decisions discussed in this Part all concerned the Constitutional Court’s response to
the problem of state capture. The cases respond in part to the pressure imposed on the value of
‘legality’; the latter can be understood as simple compliance with constraints on the behavior of senior
executive branch officials. In addition, , they can be glossed in terms of a background worry about the
sound operation of ‘democracy’; the latter can be understood as the ability of various democratically
chosen actors, including members of the legislative minority, to air complaints about government
malfeasance and wrong-doing as a necessary epistemic backdrop to renewed democratic contestation.
In their different ways, therefore, all four cases concern the problem of how a court can protect
constitutional democracy, or what Ginsburg and I have called liberal constitutional democracy, from
the potentially disabling shadow of state capture.
If the opinions are united by their cognizance of that shadow, and their awareness of the
political realities in which the Court operated, they are also marked by a diversity of analytic methods
and theoretical commitments. One way of understanding this diversity—and of linking it to the
underlying theme of judicial responsibility for constitutional democracy in the teeth of state capture—
is to see that judicial task in the face of democratic backsliding is not a matter of defending abstract
principles. It is as a matter of tactics. The Court in these four cases was not following the unfolding
logic of a single structural principle or textual command. It was, rather, engaged in a highly contextual,
Corruption Watch NPC (note 99 above) at para 19.
Corruption Watch NPC (note 99 above) at paras 26 to 29.
102 Corruption Watch NPC (note 99 above) at para 35.
103 For a discussion, see Huq, Removal as a Political Question (note 81 above).
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situationally dependent exercise by responding to the many and various ways in which an
antidemocratic movement or faction was seeking to stymie institutional levers of legality or democracy.
The ways in which democracy can be undermined are plural and unpredictable in their forms and
sequencing.104 As a result, a court trying to maintain constitutional democracy cannot be theoretically
rigid, or attend only to one element of institutional design. It must rather be tactical, responding in a
pragmatic fashion to the particulars of the situation, and not bound to an a priori constitutional theory.
To appreciate the extent to which these decisions are internally heterogeneous, consider three
different margins of comparison: the Court’s choice of interpretive methodologies; the decisions’
effect on the distribution of governmental power across institutions; and the time-frame (long-term
versus short-term) of their main effect. First, a range of different methodological approaches are
visible across the four decisions discussed in this Part. For example, Democratic Alliance and United
Democratic Movement are, at their core, relatively simple glosses upon the constitutional text.
Consequentialist analysis is largely absent in Democratic Alliance, while it is present but apparently
superfluous in United Democratic Movement. In contrast, the Corruption Watch decision starts from a highly
purposive understanding of the Constitution’s protection of prosecutorial independence. It generated
from that more holistic understanding an inference about the scope of presidential authority to reach
side-deals with senior officials. That inference, however, is hard to extract directly from the relevant
constitutional text without a dose of contextualizing, pragmatic reasoning. Similarly, the result in
Economic Freedom Fighters flowed from an understanding of the likely incentives of institutional actors
faced with corruption and graft investigations, rather than following narrowly from the constitutional
text. Accordingly, the decisions evince a mixture of methodological commitments. Indeed, they
sometimes tacked between those commitments in the context of a single decision. It is thus hard to
see any singular ‘theory’ of the separation of powers at work across these cases. The Constitutional
Court was not, in other words, reasoning from a priori, abstract grounds of constitutional theory to
specific outcome in these cases.
Second, the decisions did not have parallel effects on institutional power in the sense of
uniformly decreasing executive power or increasing legislative authority. Rather, they had dispersed
and distinct institutional logics. At the same time, their logics likely all proved conducive in either the
immediate or the long term to limitations on state capture. Economic Freedom Fighters and Corruption
Watch hence strengthened the hand of accountability institutions. The former concerned a Title IX
body, while the latter concerned an entity within the executive. In contrast, Democratic Alliance and
United Democratic Movement were cases that did not concern directly the distribution of authority
between branches. Rather, they both altered the distribution of effectual authority within the National
Assembly. Moreover, in my view United Democratic Movement is best understood as a case concerning
the distribution of power within a dominant party (which often operated as an adjunct to the
constitutional state) rather than a decision about legislative authority per se. It thus demonstrates the
Court’s awareness of the interaction between constitutional structures and political-party processes.105
It also evinces a measure of sophistication in understanding how best to shape the latter. It is striking
to note only one decision (Corruption Watch) directly concerned the scope of presidential power even
though all these decisions are plainly preoccupied with the problem of restraining a seemingly lawless
presidency.
This is a theme in Ginsburg & Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (note 26 above).
The insight is all the more striking insofar as most post-1945 constitutions contain only “a brief and general article (or
articles) acknowledging the role of political parties in contributing to the formation of the public will in a democracy.”
Gardbaum (note 97 above) at 241.
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These decisions, finally, operated in different timeframes. The immediate effect of Economic
Freedom Fighters, for example, was probably dampened by the fact that President Zuma had already
agreed to follow the remedies identified by the Public Protector. But its effect was also long-term,
insofar as it insulated and strengthened the hand of Chapter IX institutions in future fights with the
president. In contrast, the effect of the Democratic Alliance decision was likely limited to the short-term
because it made it easier (rather than more difficult) for a dominant party to punish or exclude
protesting minority or opposition party members from the National Assembly. In the long term, this
effect would fade or even reverse. Similarly, in the United Democratic Movement case, there was a quite
clear immediate effect in the form of the August 2018 secret ballot on a no-confidence motion lodged
against President Zuma. But that decision will likely also continue to shape the ability of a dominant
party to exercise control over the legislative process so as to protect an incumbent president from
various forms of accountability. Like Economic Freedom Fighters, therefore, its effects are temporally
plural and complex.
In my view, the best way to read these opinions is in terms of the Constitutional Court’s
conscious assumption of a role defending what Chief Justice Mogoeng and Justice Madlanga called
“constitutional democracy.” On the ground, this defense turns out to be not a matter of applying
some a priori theory of institutional relations under a constitution. Nor is it a matter of defending one
particular institution’s prerogatives from the threat of another. Rather, it is a pragmatic, contextsensitive exercise in responding to the particular threats presented to legality and democracy as
systemic values. Fifteen years ago, Theunis Roux commented that the Court was “adept” at a “kind
of strategic behavior.”106 Albeit in relation to quite distinct issues, that seems still to be true today.
While it would be premature to suggest that the Court has ‘succeeded’ tout court, the evidence certainly
suggests that this tactical approach to the separation of powers can play an important, if partial, role
in preventing a gradual process of erosion in the quality of constitutional democracy in the context of
pervasive, and pernicious, state capture.
IV.

Conclusion: Implications for Separation of Powers Theory

The 1996 Constitution of South Africa, as glossed by the Constitutional Court, contains a
separation of powers “to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.”107 These goals of
constitutional design map closely onto the purposes of the separation of powers in other constitutional
systems.108 It is therefore reasonable to consider the South African case law as a lens to consider the
way in which different articulations (or conceptions) of the separation of powers can be implemented.
The latter question has special resonance for American constitutionalism, where profound
disagreements on fundamentals still characterize scholarly and jurisprudential conversations on the
separation of powers.109 In concluding, therefore, I draw upon the South African jurisprudence
mapped in Part III to critique American theories of the separation of powers.

Roux (note 25 above) at 93.
Constitutional Principle VI in Schedule 4 to the interim Constitution; see also Certificate of the Constitution of Republic of
South Africa [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at para 45.
108 AZ Huq & J Michaels, ‘The Cycles of Separation of Powers Jurisprudence’ (2016) Yale Law Journal 346, 382. For a
treatment of the separation of powers under UK law, NW Barber, The Principles of Constitutionalism (2018).
109 The debates are canvassed and dissected in AZ Huq ‘Separation of Powers Metatheory” (2018) Columbia Law Review
1517, from which the following descriptions are drawn.
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In the American context, the dominant approach to the separation of powers (particularly
among the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court) is a formalist one. This approach understands each
branch as a distinctive and stand-alone entity with a lexically defined set of powers, usually derived
from textual exegesis or inference of the original meaning of the first three Articles of the
Constitution.110 The result is a judicial effort to discern answers to unexpected institutional design
questions in the inchoate and murky waters of late eighteenth century constitutional debates. Perhaps
the leading (or at least the most sophisticated) scholarly criticism points out that it is often not possible
to identify ex ante a specific government action as legislative, executive, or judicial because there is
commonly an observational equivalence between those forms of state action. Scholars working in this
vein are skeptical of any approach that treats the “relevant constitutional language . . . as a set of
descriptive labels, a set of terms like “executive,” “state,” or “judicial” (terms that seem ripe for
definition or drawing boundaries), [such that] texts are then matched against the challenged practice
under review.”111 They are skeptical that the “branch” is the truly relevant unit of analysis if one wishes
to understand and predict the actions of official actors.
The South African experience suggests that both formalism as a separation-of-powers strategy,
and the highly skeptical response to formalism, are alike flawed. In the South African context, the
Constitutional Court has worked with reasonable success to preserve constitutional democracy as a
going concern by tacking between different methodological registers rather than allowing the text or
some sort of ‘original understanding’ to dominate its reasoning.112 The success of this judicial
enterprise has two implications for the American debate. First, it suggests that formalism’s rigid focus
on the three constitutional branches defined a priori in relation to original understanding may well
have perversely destabilizing consequences. It is hard to see how formalist reasoning could conduce
to the kind of thoughtfully tactical, and hence effective, interventions as those mapped in Part III. In
addition, the Constitutional Court’s willingness to account for the rule of intra-branch and external
actors, such as political parties, starkly contrasts with the myopic assumption of American formalism
that analysis must proceed in a rigidly atomistic manner, in which branches provide the basic and
indissoluble blocks of constitutional theory. Separation-of-powers formalism, in short, would fail the
task taken on by the Constitutional Court.
At the same time, the Constitutional Court’s response to the Zuma presidency suggests that it
would be premature to lapse into unmitigated skepticism about the separation of powers as a
framework for analyzing the production of systemic public goods such as the rule of law and
democracy. Such skepticism is belied by the ability of the Constitutional Court to identify legal
interventions that serve a useful purpose, and then to craft decisions that select for immediate and
long-term effects in ways that are plausibly responsive to the project of protecting constitutional
democracy.
Instead, the cases canvassed above underscore a different, more useful way of thinking about
the purposes of governmental design decisions. They suggest that to the extent that the separation of
powers is looked to as safeguard of constitutional democracy, it might be best comprehended as a
The standard citation for an academic defense of this theory is SG Calabresi & SB Prakash ‘The President's Power to
Execute the Laws’ (1994) Yale Law Journal 541.
111 VF Nourse ‘Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy’ (2004) Stanford Law Review 835, 841; ME Magill ‘Beyond Powers
and Branches in Separation of Powers Law; (2001) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 603.
112 Originalism, in any case, has not made in-roads as an interpretive methodology beyond the United States. D Fontana
‘Comparative Originalism’ (2009) Texas Law Review See Also 189.
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pool of institutional resources to be leveraged in the face of mutative challenges to that order. That
pool is institutionally diverse. It includes not just for branches but also Chapter IX institutions;
institutions within branches such as the Director or Public Prosecutions; and also institutions that cut
across the branches, such as political parties. Institutional pluralism of this sort gives the Court a range
of options for responding to diverse forms of democratic backsliding: Different redoubts of resistance
to democratic backsliding can be protected. This matters because modern challenges to constitutional
democracy tend to be opportunistic and unpredictable in their approaches. Opposition to democracy,
that is, requires no theory. It instead takes advantage of whatever weaknesses exist in a given
constitutional structure.
Accordingly, the judicial enforcement of the separation of powers to promote constitutional
democracy must also be agile, responsive, and provisional, rather than a matter of static relations
calibrated by a priori theory, therefore, the separation of powers should be comprehended as a fluid
(even open) set of concepts and potential judicial moves. Contra the skeptics, this project can bear
fruit by enlarging the space for democracy’s allies (often in the parliamentary opposition, and
frequently mobilized by a fear of being excluded permanently from power). Even if courts cannot
save democracy on their own, that is, they can create political space in which others can do so. The
greater the ensuing flexibility, the greater the chance that a court sympathetic to democratic norms
might find ways to delay and defer state capture long enough for popular mobilization to neutralize
more directly that threat.113 If there is no guarantee of success, nonetheless, recent South African
experience suggests the project is hardly one that is doomed to fail.

To be clear, I do not think that a high court will necessarily be committed to democracy, or will be willing to take
risks to defend democracy. AZ Huq ‘Democratic Erosion and the Courts: Comparative Perspectives’ (2018) New York
University Law Review Online 21. In the United States, for example, the Supreme Court as currently constituted is probably
more hostile than friendly to democratic norms, specifically through its willingness to enable and even accelerate
concentrations of executive and corporate power; its unwillingness to tolerate campaign finance reform; its openness to
restrictions on the franchise and self-dealing by political elites in the form of partisan gerrymandering; its willingness to
allow aligned political elites to transform policy disputes into novel constitutional problems (e.g., the challenges to the
Affordable Care Act); and its reluctance to rein in police and security services who overstep their public safety mission,
and instead curb free speech or assembly rights. One of the open questions in American constitutionalism is the extent
to which democratic majorities—if allowed to gain power—will tolerate such an antidemocratic and even unjust
institution.
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